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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]n a civilized state where reciprocal legal rights and duties
abound the words "at will" can never mean "without limit or
qualification". . . for in such a state the rights of each person are
necessarily and inherently limited by the rights of others and the
interests of the public. An at will prerogative without limits could
be suffered only in an anarchy, and not there for long - it cer-
tainly cannot be suffered in a society such as ours without weak-
ening the bond of counterbalancing rights and obligations that
holds such societies together. . . . [T]here can be no right to ter-
minate such [an employment] contract for an unlawful reason or
purpose that contravenes public policy.1
[T]he law of North Carolina is well established. An employer may
terminate any employee for any reason unless the employee has a
specific duration contract, gave some additional consideration for
permanent employment, or lost his job for refusing to give per-
jured testimony.2
Traditionally, employers have relied upon the doctrine of em-
ployment at will to discharge employees "for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong."3 In its pristine form, em-
1. Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc.
rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
2. Guy v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 812 F.2d 911, 915 (4th Cir. 1987).
3. Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884), overruled
on other grounds sub nom. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134
(1915). Accord Adler v. American Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (4th
Cir. 1987) ("[An employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can
be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time."); Davis v. Wil-
liams, 617 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space
Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (D.S.C. 1985) ("an employment contract termi-
nable at the will of either party may be terminated at any time, for any reason, or
for no reason at all"); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala.
1977); H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.1, at n.1 (2d ed.
1987) (hereinafter PERRIrr).
Employment at will has long been generally recognized in North Carolina.
E.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Edwards v.
[Vol. 10:217218
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ployment at will provides that employment of indefinite duration
can be terminated at the discretion of either party at any time.
With the exception of several special purpose statutes4 that afford
Seaboard & Roanoke R.R., 121 N.C. 489, 28 S.E. 137 (1897); Harris v. Duke
Power Co., 83 N.C. App. 195, 197, 349 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1986) (The at will rule has
"few and narrow exceptions" in North Carolina), aff'd, 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d
357 (1987). See Watkins v. Milliken & Co., 613 F. Supp. 408, 422 (W.D.N.C.
1984), where the court noted that "absent agreement upon a definite term of du-
ration, employment contracts are terminable at the will of either party without
regard to cause." But see Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436
(1943) (good faith standard); Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874) (employer
not free to discharge in bad faith); Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C.
App. 253, 262, 335 S.E.2d 79, 85 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341
S.E.2d 39 (1986) ("an employer's power to terminate 'at will' cannot be absolute
. . ."). See generally L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 2.01 (1986)
(hereinafter LARSON); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will
Rule, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118 (1976); Parker, The Uses of the Past: The Surpris-
ing History of Terminable at Will Employment in North Carolina, 22 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 167 (1987); Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Excep-
tion to the Employment-at-Will Rule, 62 N.C.L. REV. 840 (1986);
The origins of the at will rule have been described as "bizarre." Murphy v.
American -Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 308, 448 N.E.2d 86, 93 (1983)
(Meyer, J., dissenting). See also Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 601-03, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886 (1980). Beginning with the seminal article of
Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967), scores of commenta-
tors have advocated abolition of the at will rule. E.g., Parker, supra; PERRITT,
supra, § 1.11, at n.47.
4. E.g., Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982) (permits removal of fed-
eral civil service employees "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service"); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982) (pro-
hibits discharge of employees whose wages are garnished for indebtedness; see,
e.g., Ellis v. Glover & Gardner Constr. Co., 562 F. Supp. 1054 [M.D. Tenn. 1983]);
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (prohibits dis-
charge of employees for jury service); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
151-187 (1982) (Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees' rights "to engage
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157; see, e.g., NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393 [1983]); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215
(1982) (prohibits discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the Act; see, e.g., Marshall v. Lincoln School Dist. No.
48, 600 F.2d 147 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 [1979]); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1982) (prohibits age
discrimination of persons between ages of 40 and 70 and reprisals for exercising
statutory rights); Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 660(c)
(1982) (prohibits discharge of employees in reprisal for exercising rights under the
Act; see, e.g., Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 611 F.2d 1 [1st Cir. 1979]);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (pro-
19881 219
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protection against discrimination and reprisal for exercising certain
rights, there is no general principle that consistently alters the at
will rule. Approximately two-thirds of all employees are governed
by the at will rule5; thus, it has a profound impact on employment
relations law, particularly in North Carolina.
Many courts have recognized exceptions that limit the em-
ployer's right to discharge. Approximately four-fifths of the states
now recognize some form of cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge.6 The exceptions to the at will rule have generally taken
three forms: public policy, implied contract terms, and the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The public policy exception is the most
recognized and applies when an employee is discharged for reasons
that contravene public policy.7
Several courts have recognized implied contract theories in
wrongful discharge litigation.8 Various employment policies and
vides employee protection from discharge to avoid vesting of pension benefits; see,
e.g., Bittner v. Sadoff, 728 F.2d 820 [7th Cir. 1984]); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1367 (1982) (prohibits discharge of employees for
reporting or testifying in proceedings against employer for violating the Act); Vet-
eran's Preference Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982) (grants veterans the right to return
to their former jobs and prohibits discharge for one year); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and reprisal for exercising
certain Title VII rights); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7622 (1982) (prohibits
discharge of employees for reporting or testifying in proceedings against employer
for violating the Act); PERRITT, supra note 3, at §§ 2.1-2.24 (2d ed. 1987); LARSON,
supra note 3, at § 11.03 (1987).
5. PERRirr, supra note 3, at § 1.12; Herman & Sor, Property Rights In One's
Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-At-Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763 n.4 (1982).
See Note, Emerging Protection Against Retaliatory Discharge: A Public Policy
Exception To The Employment At Will Doctrine In Maine, 38 ME. L. REv. 67
(1986).
6. Parker, supra note 3, at 170; Brown & Morris, Employment at Will, 10
DIST. LAW. 42 (1985); Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge, 40
Bus. LAW. 1 (1984); Death of a Doctrine, Nat'l Law Journal 1 (Jan. 20, 1986);
PERRITT, supra note 3, at § 1.12; Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employee, 31 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 317 (1984).
7. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1932, 1936 (1983); Sides, 74 N.C.
App. at 339-41, 328 S.E.2d at 824-26. See generally Lucas v. Brown & Root, 736
F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa.
1979); DeRose v. Putnam Management Co., Inc., 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d 428
(1986); Note, Employment at Will, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 457 (1985).
8. See Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980); Note, Implied
Contract Rights To Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974); Note, Challenging
[Vol. 10:217
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procedures have recognized implied contracts to discharge for just
cause only. Statements in employment manuals and handbooks as
well as verbal and written assurances have been afforded contrac-
tual status." However, North Carolina has rejected the proposition
that unilaterally promulgated personnel policies may establish em-
ployment terms and conditions when the policies are not expressly
incorporated into the employment contract.10
the Employment at Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 449 (1983); Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer
May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4th 544, at §§ 6-14
(1982); PERRITr, supra note 3, at §§ 4.1-4.28. "Neither the Supreme Court nor the
General Assembly of North Carolina has yet recognized an 'implied contract' ex-
ception to the general rule of at-will employment." Watkins v. Milliken & Co., 613
F. Supp. 408, 422 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
9. E.g., Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va.
1987); Toussaint, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1982); LARSON, supra note
3, at §§ 8.01-8.04, PERRIrr, supra note 3, at §§ 8.1-8.15.
10. Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987); Walker v.
Westinghouse Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc. rev. denied,
315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39 (1986); Smith v. Monsanto Corp., 71 N.C. App. 632,
322 S.E.2d 611 (1984); Griffin v. Housing Auth., 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200
(1983); Note, Continued Resistance of the Inclusion of Personnel Policies in
Contracts of Employment: Griffin v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 62 N.C.L. REV.
1326 (1984). See Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At Will" Employee
As Affected By Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies After Dis-
charge, 33 A.L.R. 4th 120 (1984). Cf. Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 827 F.2d 355,
360 (8th Cir. 1987). But cf. Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 56 N.C. App. 801,
290 S.E.2d 370 (1982), where the court held that although the employee manual
was subject to change at any time, it "would nevertheless operate to protect em-
ployees within its coverage during their employment and during the effective op-
eration of such a provision." Id. at 804, 290 S.E.2d at 372.
In Harris, 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that an employer's personnel manual or policy is not incorporated into an
employment contract or relation where the personnel manual or policy does not
contain any promises or representations to the employees. In Harris, the em-
ployee alleged that he was discharged without cause in violation of the employer's
"management procedure manual." Id. at 628, 356 S.E.2d at 358. The manual was
directed toward management personnel and related solely to the implementation
of disciplinary actions against employees. Id. at 630, 356 S.E.2d at 360.
The court in Harris noted the at will rule and its exceptions. Id. at 629, 356
S.E.2d at 359-60. With respect to the identified exceptions to the at will rule, the
court noted that "statutory authority often dictates that an otherwise terminable-
at-will employee shall not be discharged in retaliation for certain protected activi-
ties . . . " Id. Cf. Guy, 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1987), with supra text accompany-
ing note 2, and infra text accompanying notes 72-81. The court in Harris stated
that the plaintiff's claim was not included within any of the exceptions to the at
5
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Courts have also imposed an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment relations.11 Employers may breach
will rule and that plaintiff urged the court to join the jurisdictions recognizing the
inclusion of a personnel policy into the employment contract. Harris, 319 N.C. at
629, 356 S.E.2d at 359. See, e.g., Annotation, supra, at §§ 3-4 (1984 & Supp.
1986); Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment at Will Contracts, 1985
DuKE L.J. 196.
In Harris, the court observed that the court of appeals in Trought v. Richard-
son, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986), and decisions from other jurisdic-
tions provide that the personnel manual becomes part of the employment relation
where it contains an express representation that employees will be discharged
only for cause. 319 N.C. at 630-31, 356 S.E.2d at 360. The facts of Harris were
"readily distinguished" from Trought because "of the specific no-discharge-
except-for-cause allegation in Trought." Id. at 631, 356 S.E.2d at 360.
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Exum joined by Justice Martin clari-
fies the decision in Harris. The Chief Justice highlighted the critical distinction in
the employer personnel manuals. The Chief Justice explained that the "manage-
ment procedure" manual in Harris was not part of the employment contract be-
cause the manual made "no promises, express or implied, to defendant's employ-
ees." Id. at 633, 356 S.E.2d at 361. The majority opinion in Harris expressly noted
that it did not address this issue in Trought. Id. at 631, 356 S.E.2d at 360. The
Chief Justice went on to state:
[I]n my view, an employer's personnel policies, if couched in language
that either expressly or by implication makes promises to employees,
may bind the employer to these promises and restrict the employer's
power to discharge even if the policies are unilaterally promulgated and
are supported by no consideration apart from the employee's acceptance
or continuation of employment.
Id. at 633, 356 S.E.2d at 361, citing Trought, Toussaint, and Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). The Chief Justice has concisely
stated the majority position on this issue. See also Cutter v. Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1986) (Arnold, J., dissenting); Barger v. General
Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1984); Matson v. Cargill, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
278, 284-85 (D. Minn. 1985) (general statements of employer policy insufficient to
form an offer).
11. E.g., Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1644, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 778 (1986); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977); Kerr v. Gibson's Prods. Co., 733 P.2d 1292 (Mont. 1987); Crenshaw v.
Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984); Gates v. Life of Montana
Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974); LARSON, supra note 3, at § 3.05; PERRITT, supra note 3,
at §§ 1.2, 4.11, 4.23; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816
(1980). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979), which provides
that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in its performance and its enforcement." The commentary to § 205 provides
that "[s]ubterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in perform-
6
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this duty by terminating an employee arbitrarily or without just
cause. Under this theory, a wrongful discharge action may be rec-
ognized where the termination was premised upon bad faith or
malice. In Haskins v. Royster, 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court
in 1874 recognized a limited form of this theory of wrongful dis-
charge by holding that an employer is not free to discharge in bad
faith.13 However, recent North Carolina cases have not considered
or applied the thrust of Haskins.
In Sides v. Duke Hospital,"' the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals first recognized the public policy exception to the at will rule.
ance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation
goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing
may require more than honesty." Id. at § 205. The Reporter's Note to § 205 cites
Fortune, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), where the court held that the
premise for the employer's obligation not to discharge in bad faith was the im-
plied covenant of good faith. The court in Fortune further relied upon the Uni-
form Commercial Code § 1-203 which imposes an obligation of good faith. Some
courts have limited the implied covenant doctrine to terminations which violate
public policy. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834
(1983). But see Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 461 (D. Md. 1987);
Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Col. 1983).
12. 70 N.C. 601 (1874). Cf. McCabe v. General Foods, 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.
1987) (bad faith theory of recovery permitted); Monge, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974). But see Satterfield, 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D. S.C. 1985);
Trought, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986). There has been some support
for the Haskins good faith requirement. In Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C.
148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943), the court reaffirmed Haskins by holding that "an indef-
inite general hiring" is terminable in good faith at the will of either party." Id. at
149, 25 S.E.2d at 437. "Malever shows that Haskins is not an aberration." Parker,
supra note 3, at 219. Professor Parker notes that "the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Haskins was among the first courts in the nation to insist that employers
act in good faith when discharging employees." Id. at 220. "[The] Haskins re-
quirement of good faith has neither been overruled expressly nor sub silentio
." Id. at 219.
13. See Parker, supra note 3, at 175. Parker states:
[T]he North Carolina Supreme Court of the era that first recognized
the doctrine of terminable at will employment placed limits on the power
employers enjoyed in dealing with their employees. In Haskins v. Roy-
ster, a case from 1874, the court clearly held that employers could not
discharge employees in bad faith. This holding removes abusive dis-
charges from the scope of the at will doctrine, for abusive discharges are
unrelated to any legitimate expectations the employer could have regard-
ing his contract with the employee and by definition are in bad faith.
[footnotes omitted]
Id.
14. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985).
1988]
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Sides held that the discharge of an at will employee on grounds
offensive to public policy is an actionable tort. 5 Judge Phillips's
authoritative opinion in Sides presents a comprehensive review of
the wrongful discharge doctrine. Sides appeared to represent a ma-
jor development in North Carolina employment relations law.
However, subsequent decisions by the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals have confusingly and narrowly construed Sides. Neverthe-
less, Sides provides fertile ground for further development of the
doctrine of wrongful discharge in North Carolina.
In Guy v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,1 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit substantially restricted the
scope of the North Carolina public policy exception in the federal
courts. In Guy, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a
North Carolina wrongful discharge action premised upon the pub-
lic policy exception.17 The employee alleged that he was discharged
for refusing to falsify pharmaceutical records. 18 Although the facts
of Guy presented the most compelling scenario for application of
the public policy exception, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the
public policy exception as being limited to the egregious facts of
Sides.
This article will analyze Sides, Guy, and other authorities rele-
vant to the development of the doctrine of wrongful discharge in
North Carolina. With support from recent commentary,19 this arti-
cle concludes that the true meaning of the North Carolina public
policy exception is not limited to the facts of Sides. Rather, Sides
and earlier authorities provide that abusive employee discharges in
violation of established public policy are not insulated by the at
will rule.
II. ANALYSIS OF SIDES
A. Background of Sides
Plaintiff Marie Sides filed a wrongful discharge action pre-
mised upon the public policy exception against Duke University
Hospital, two physicians, and the chief nurse anesthetist at Duke.
Sides also alleged claims for breach of contract and interference
with contractual relations. The trial court granted defendants' mo-
15. Id. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27.
16. 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1987).
17. Id. at 917.
18. Id. at 912.
19. See Parker, supra note 3.
224 [Vol. 10:217
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/1
SIDES TO GuY: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.2"
Sides alleged that she was employed by Duke as a nurse anes-
thetist in 1970.21 One of Sides' primary inducements for accepting
the position at Duke was job security. 22 Plaintiff was assured by
Duke that nurse anesthetists could only be discharged for incom-
petence.13 This termination policy was shared by other Duke em-
ployees throughout Sides' eleven-year tenure at. Duke.24
In 1980, the estate of a former Duke patient initiated a mal-
practice action against Duke and several individuals, including
Doctors Harmel and Miller.23 In that case, the plaintiff allegedly
suffered brain damage due to the negligent administration of anes-
thetics by Dr. Miller.26 When the patient came out of surgery,
Sides was on duty and Dr. Miller instructed Sides to administer
certain anesthetics to the patient.2 7 Sides refused to administer the
anesthetics because she thought the anesthetics would harm the
patient.28 Dr. Miller then administered the anesthetics to the pa-
tient, who suffered permanent brain damage.2 9
Prior to having her deposition taken in the malpractice action,
Sides was advised by several Duke physicians, attorneys, and
others that she should not testify to all that she had seen regarding
the patient's treatment at Duke. ° Some of the doctors warned
Sides that, if she did, she "would be in trouble."31 Similar pres-
sures already had caused another nurse anesthetist to withhold in-
formation at her deposition. Despite the pressure, Sides testified
fully and truthfully at her deposition.3 2 After the deposition, Duke
physicians, particularly doctors Harmel and Miller, adopted hostile
attitudes toward Sides.3 Sides testified fully and truthfully in the
malpractice action and a verdict was returned for the patient's es-
20. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820.
21. Id. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820.
22. Id., 328 S.E.2d at 820-21.
23. Id. at 332-33, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
24. Id. at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
19881 225
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tate for $1,750,000. Dr. Harmel believed that Sides had caused
them to lose the case.3 4 Concerned that her testimony might cause
problems, Sides asked the chief nurse to advise her of any com-
plaints about her work. The chief nurse refused to advise her of
such.3 5
After the malpractice trial, some physicians displayed hostile
attitudes toward Sides, and some refused to work with her. Dr.
Miller told other physicians that they should have nothing to do
with her, and Dr. Harmel encouraged these hostilities, which made
the performance of Side's duties almost impossible. 6 Sides again
asked the chief nurse to assist her with these problems and was
again refused. Sides was subsequently called into a meeting and
was advised that her job performance was poor and that she had
an "abusive attitude.""1 Sides asked for specific examples of how
her work performance was poor, but none were given. Later, the
chief nurse and Dr. Harmel met with Sides and discharged her. 8
B. Sides' Wrongful Discharge Analysis
In Sides, the court of appeals confronted the decision in Dock-
ery v. Lampart Table Co.,39 which refused to recognize an action
for wrongful discharge. Dockery involved an alleged discharge in
retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim.40 The plaintiff
in Dockery argued that, notwithstanding the general at will rule, a
wrongful discharge action should be recognized because the
worker's compensation claim was authorized by statute and be-
cause public policy required it.41 The court concluded that the
"failure of the General Assembly to specifically provide the claim
for relief alleged by the Plaintiff was an indication of its intent
that no such claim be created.""' However, in its next session, the
General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing actions by em-
ployees demoted or discharged in retaliation for instituting a
34. Id. at 333-34, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d
215 (1978).
40. Id. at 293, 244 S.E.2d at 273.
41. Id. at 297-98, 244 S.E.2d at 275-76.
42. Id. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
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worker's compensation claim or for testifying in regard to it.43
Therefore, as noted in Sides, the Dockery court apparently mis-
read the legislative intent concerning retaliatory discharges."
The Sides court stated that "we think, that the legislature is
not at all adverse to the courts of this state entertaining actions
based on a violation of policies that have been enacted or other-
wise established for the protection of the public. ' 45 The court rec-
ognized the strong public interest in allowing workers to pursue
their statutory remedies for compensation without fear of retalia-
tion and noted that the public interest in preventing the obstruc-
tion of justice is even greater.' The court stressed the problems
associated with perjury and the resulting "affront to the integrity
of our judicial system.' ' 47 Therefore, Dockery was not controlling,
and the court held that Sides had stated an actionable claim.41
In Sides, the court relied upon the seminal California case of
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,9 which
held that an at will employee stated a cause of action when he
alleged that he had been fired for refusing to commit perjury. The
Petermann court noted that at will employees could usually be dis-
charged for "any reason whatsoever; .. . [h]owever, the right to
discharge an employee under such a contract may be limited by
statute or considerations of public policy."50 The Sides court then
cited with approval numerous cases from other jurisdictions recog-
nizing the doctrine of wrongful discharge."
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1987); Note, Worker's Compensation - Retali-
atory Discharge - The Legislative Response to Dockery v. Lampart Table Co.,
58 N.C.L. REV. 629 (1980). See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976)
(cause of action recognized for discharge motivated by filing of workers compensa-
tion claim). Cf. Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1983); Buie v.
Daniel Int'l Corp., 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118 (1982); Murray Corp. v.
Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
44. 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
45. Id. Cf. DeRose v. Putnam Management Co., 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d
428 (1986) (refusing to give false testimony).
46. 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
47. Id. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
48. Id.
49. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
50. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
51. E.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (quality control director discharged for insistence that employer comply
with federal and state food, drug, and cosmetics laws; but see Guy, 812 F.2d 911
1988]
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After recognizing the many cases eroding the doctrine of em-
ployment at will, the Sides court set forth a novel rationale for
modification of the at will doctrine: "[I]n a civilized state where
reciprocal legal rights and duties abound the words 'at will' can
never mean without limit or qualification . . . An at will preroga-
tive without limits could be suffered only in an anarchy. '52 The
court then stated that an at will employee cannot be discharged
"for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public
policy."5 3
C. Breach of Contract and Tortious Interference
In addition to the wrongful discharge claim, Sides asserted a
claim for breach of contract. Sides' complaint alleged that she was
assured by Duke that she could only be discharged for incompe-
tence and that this assurance induced her to move from Michigan
to accept the position at Duke .5 Relying upon Tuttle v. Kerners-
ville Lumber Co. 55 and Burkhimer v. Gealy,56 the court held that
Sides' relocation from Michigan was sufficient consideration to re-
move her employment contract from the terminable at will sta-
tus.5 7 Thus, Sides stated an actionable claim for breach of an em-
ployment contract.
Sides also alleged a claim against doctors Harmel and Miller
for wrongfully interfering with her contractual relations with Duke.
[4th Cir. 1987]); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625
(1982) (employee discharged to prevent testimony before grand jury or any subse-
quent criminal trial); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.W.2d 876 (1981) (employee discharged for informing police of crimes of another
employee and agreeing to testify against him); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (employee dis-
charged for refusing to alter results of tests on pollution control reports); Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for failure to refuse
jury duty); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978) (employee discharged for serving jury duty); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank,
162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (employee discharged for efforts to make
employer comply with state and federal consumer protection credit laws).
52. 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
53. Id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
54. Id. at 332-33, 328 S.E.2d at 820-21.
55. 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964).
56. 39 N.C. App. 450, 250 S.E.2d 678, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 298, 254
S.E.2d 918 (1979) (moving residence from one place to another to accept employ-
ment constitutes consideration for an employment contract).
57. 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
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This claim is recognized in North Carolina and is applicable in an
employment context even though the employment is terminable at
will.58 The elements of this claim are that: 1) a valid contract ex-
isted between the plaintiff and a third person; 2) an outsider to the
contract had knowledge of the contract; 3) the outsider intention-
ally induced the third person not to perform the contract with the
plaintiff; 4) the outsider had no justification for so interfering; and
5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result."" The court held that
Sides had sufficiently alleged this claim for relief.6 0
D. The Public Policy Exception
1. Beyond Sides
The public policy exception is the most recognized modifica-
tion of the at will doctrine and is the only wrongful discharge ra-
tionale expressly adopted by the court in Sides. To state a claim
under this theory, the employee must demonstrate that he was dis-
charged because he "performed an act that public policy would en-
courage or refused to do something that public policy would
condemn.""1
Courts have applied the public policy exception to three gen-
eral categories of discharges. First, the refusal to commit an un-
lawful act provides a basis for a wrongful discharge action under
the public policy exception. Sides neatly fits into this category. Ex-
amples of other cases within this category include claims where an
employee was dismissed for refusing to participate in an illegal
58. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Childress v.
Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954); Fitzgerald v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197,
252 S.E.2d 523 (1979). See Note, Tortious Interference With Contractual Rela-
tions in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract,
and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-
67 (1979).
59. 74 N.C. App. at 346, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
60. Id. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27.
61. Vandegrift v. American Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496, 497 (D. N.H.
1983). See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1373-74 (9th Cir.
1984); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 897-900 (3d Cir. 1983). In
McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 360 S.E.2d 221, 227 (W. Va. 1987), the court
noted that "[olne of the fundamental rights of an employee is the right not to be
the victim of a 'retaliatory discharge,' that is, a discharge from employment where
the employer's motivation for the discharge is in contravention of a substantial
public policy."
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price-fixing scheme,62 for refusing to perform a medical procedure
that the employee could not lawfully perform, 63 and for refusing to
perform unethical tasks.64 The second category of actionable dis-
charges involves a discharge due to the employee's performance of
a public obligation. Examples include cases where employees have
been discharged for serving on a jury65 and for various forms of
"whistle blowing" of illegal conduct.6 6 The court in Sides approv-
ingly cited numerous whistle-blowing and public obligation cases.
The third category of actionable discharges involves discharges
premised upon the exercise of an employee's legal rights or privi-
leges. Examples include cases involving discharges for filing a
workers' compensation claim6 7 and for refusing to take polygraph
tests.68
62. Tamey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980). Accord Hanscrote v. American Indus. Technologies, 586 F.
Supp. 113 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (refusal to engage in commercial bribery).
63. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
64. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980); cf. Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761, 763 (Ala. 1982).
65. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). See Wiskotoni v. Michi-
gan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Ludwick v. This Minute of
Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985) (Following Sides, the South
Carolina Supreme Court recognized the public policy exception where an em-
ployee was discharged after honoring a subpoena to appear at a state employment
security commission hearing.).
66. Whistle blowing occurs when an employee reports employer violations of
statutory policy. Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the
Employment at Will Rule, 624 N.C.L. REV. 840, 846 n.68 (1986). See Garibaldi v.
Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Guy, infra notes 85-106 and
accompanying text; PERRIr, supra note 3, at § 5.16; Malin, Protecting the
Whistleblower From Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983).
67. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). Cf.
Buie, 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118 (1982) (workers' compensation statute
authorizes civil actions for retaliatory discharge).
68. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.
1979); Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Some
courts have recognized the public policy exception for certain discriminatory dis-
charges. Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (age and
sex discrimination in violation of statute states public policy tort claim); Wynn v.
Boening, 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984) (public policy tort claim for race dis-
crimination covered by Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Wolber v. Service Corp.,
612 F. Supp. 235 (D. Nev. 1985) (recognizing age discrimination as a basis for a
wrongful discharge action premised upon the public policy exception); Savodnik
v. Korvette's, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (discharge violated state pol-
icy of protecting integrity of pension plans); McKinney v. National Dairy Council,
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The Third Circuit opened a new avenue of relief in this third
category by recognizing a wrongful discharge claim premised upon
an employee's constitutional and political rights. In Novosel v. Na-
tionwide Insurance Co.,69 the court recognized that the political
and associational rights guaranteed by federal and state constitu-
tional provisions constitute a public policy basis for a wrongful dis-
charge claim. In Novosel, the plaintiff alleged that he had been
discharged for refusing to participate in his employer's lobbying
efforts in favor of no-fault insurance legislation and for privately
opposing his employer's political positions.70 The court in Novosel
noted that "the protection of an employee's freedom of political
expression would appear to involve no less compelling a societal
interest than the fulfillment of jury service or the filing of a
worker's compensation claim. 71 Novosel represents a novel appli-
491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (discharge violated public policy against age
discrimination); Payne v. Rozendaal, 147 Vt. 488, 520 A.2d 586 (1986) (age dis-
crimination is a proper basis for a wrongful discharge action premised upon the
public policy exception).
In Crawford v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 87-3589 (4th Cir. 1987)(appeal dock-
eted), the Fourth Circuit is presented with the question of whether age discrimi-
nation may form the basis for a wrongful discharge action premised upon the
public policy exception in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT § 143-422.2 (1987) for-
bids age discrimination in employment; thus the public policy basis in Crawford
seems clear. However, the district court in Crawford relied upon Guy as a basis
for the dismissal of Crawford's wrongful discharge claim. See 2 EGLIT, AGE Dis-
CRIMINATION § 15.23 at 88-89 (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
may properly form a public policy basis to support a common law wrongful dis-
charge action). Preemption was not raised as a defense in Crawford. See infra
note 80.
69. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). In McClung, 360 S.E.2d at 227, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that:
[clertainly it is in contravention of substantial public policies for an em-
ployer to discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee's exercis-
ing his or her state constitutional rights to petition for redress of griev-
ances. . . and to seek access to the courts of this State. . .by filing an
action ...for overtime wages.
In McClung, the employee alleged that he was discharged for pursuing remedies
to obtain wages under the state wage and hour laws. Id. at 226. McClung did not
cite Novosel as authority but nevertheless expressly relied upon the West Virginia
Constitution as a public policy in which to form the basis of a wrongful discharge
action. Id. Cf. Mansour v. Abrams, 120 A.D.2d 933, 502 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1986). But
see Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D.D.C. 1986), where the
court did not adopt the Novosel approach and required state action.
70. Novosel at 896.
71. Id. at 899. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (free speech rights
of public employees); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (political pa-
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cation of constitutional rights to private employees and may serve
as a blueprint for substantially expanding the wrongful discharge
doctrine.
2. What is Public Policy?
The threshhold question to be addressed in a wrongful dis-
charge case premised upon the public policy exception is whether
or not a sufficient expression of public policy is alleged. As the
court in Petermann noted, the "term 'Public Policy' is inherently
not subject to precise definition . . . . Public Policy is a vague ex-
pression, and few cases can arise in which its application may not
be disputed. '72 "A public policy conceivably could be so clear as to
be established or not established as a matter of law . . . . -7 How-
ever, in most instances, the existence of public policy necessitates a
balancing process that is properly decided by the jury.74
tronage discharge); McClung, 360 S.E.2d at 227.
72. 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959). See Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 716 F.2d
at 381-82; PERRIrr, supra note 3, at § 7.11. Courts have required that the public
policy be "substantial," Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 124, 246
S.E.2d 270, 275 (1978), and that there be "a clear mandate of public policy."
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982). See
Adams v. Catalyst Research, 659 F. Supp. 163 (D. Md. 1987); Newman, 628 F.
Supp. at 539 ("clear mandate" test employed); Pierce, 84 N.J. at 58, 417 A.2d at
512 (same). In Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 376, 290 N.W.2d 536, 538
(1980), the court required "a clearly defined and well established public policy."
Defining a coherent doctrine of public policy has long been a source of confusion.
"[J]urists to this day have been unable to fashion a truly workable definition of
public policy . . ." Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n. v.
Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 605-06, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (1978).
However, in wrongful discharge litigation, public policy has often been nar-
rowly defined. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d
464 (1981); Note, Protecting Employees at Will, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931, 1947-50
(1983) (hereinafter Note, Protecting Employees at Will). In W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), the Court noted that public policy "is to be
ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests," quoting Muschany v. United States,
324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945). "It is beyond question that obedience to judicial orders is
an important public policy." Id. Some courts require that claims for abusive dis-
charge should state specifically how the public policy was offended. E.g., Miller v.
Fairchild Indus., 668 F. Supp. 461 (D. Md. 1987). See infra note 118 and the
statutory definition of public policy set forth in the Montana Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act § 3(7).
73. Vandegrift, 572 F. Supp. at 498-99. Cf. Adler, 830 F.2d 1303, 1306-07
(4th Cir. 1987).
74. Vandegrift, 572 F. Supp. at 498, citing Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
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Public policy may be found in "legislation; administrative
rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions . . . and in
certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an ex-
pression of public policy."75 Certainly, when a legislature has en-
acted legislation forbidding certain conduct, that conduct is
against public policy. 76 As noted in Sides, the North Carolina legis-
lature has expressly prohibited perjury; thus, the expression of
public policy was clear. Sides also noted that courts may entertain
"actions based on a violation of policies that have been enacted or
otherwise established . . . .,7 Sides therefore expressly suggested
that North Carolina courts may employ nonstatutory sources of
public policy. A careful reading of Sides leads one to the ines-
capable conclusion that the court intended to define public policy
broadly; however, this reading is not legitimized in subsequent
cases.
Numerous courts have recognized that federal public policy
may properly form the basis for a wrongful discharge claim in state
court.78 The Third Circuit in Novosel squarely held that a recog-
nizable expression of public policy may be derived from the United
States Constitution as well as a state constitution.79 Courts have
also recognized a common law claim for wrongful discharge even
where a legislature has provided a remedy to enforce the same
right. For instance, in McKinney v. National Dairy Council,80 the
Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981). See PERRITT, supra note 3, at §
7.11.
75. Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512 (1980). See Wagenseller v. Scotts-
dale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (court decisions, stat-
utes, and constitutions are sources of public policy); Note, Protecting Employees
At Will, supra note 72, at 1947-50.
76. E.g., Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984);
Wolber v. Service Corp. Int'l, 612 F. Supp. 235, 237 (D. Nev. 1985).
77. 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
78. E.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D. Md.
1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987); McNulty v. Bor-
den, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
79. 721 F.2d at 900.
80. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980). However, issues of preemption are
presented when a statutory remedy and a common law remedy exist for the same
conduct. See Garibaldi, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (wrongful discharge claim
not preempted by Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) [1982]);
Stepanischen v. Merchants Dispatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983)
(anti-union animus violates public policy); Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores,
672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (ADEA does not preempt state tort claim). PERRITT,
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court held that alleged age discrimination stated a common law
claim for wrongful discharge, even though this permitted the plain-
tiff to circumvent the administrative requirements in state and
federal age discrimination statutes. The wrongful discharge claim
usually allows for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
that are unavailable under the statutory provisions; thus, a wrong-
ful discharge action offers numerous advantages for plaintiffs to
consider.
E. Damages
In Sides, the court held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a
claim for compensatory and punitive damages by alleging that the
defendants acted willfully and maliciously. 1 Wrongful discharge
litigation often results in substantial verdicts. In Rawson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.,8 2 the court upheld a staggering $19 million verdict
in a wrongful discharge action as not excessive. In Cancellier v.
Federated Department Stores,"3 three employees were awarded
$1.9 million in actual and punitive damages plus $400,000 in attor-
supra note 3, at §§ 2.27-2.34. But see Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717
F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1983) (retaliatory discharge claim preempted by Railway La-
bor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153 [1982]); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.
1977) (wrongful discharge claim for age discrimination preempted by State
Human Relations Act). See generally Note, NLRA Preemption of State Law Ac-
tions for Wrongful Discharge In Violation of Public Policy, 19 U. MICH. J. OF L.
REF. 441 (1986); Brody, Labor Preemption Again - After The Searing of Gar-
mon, 13 SW. U.L. REV. 201 (1982). Some courts have recognized a common law
remedy in addition to a statutory remedy. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138
Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982); Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d
960 (1980), aff'd, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1980).
81. 74 N.C. App. at 348-49, 328 S.E.2d at 830. See Cagle v. Burns & Roe,
Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911, 726 P.2d 434 (1986) (emotional distress damages recover-
able for public policy tort); McClung, 360 S.E.2d 221, 229 (W. Va. 1987); Harless
v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982) (damages for emotional distress
and lost wages upheld). In wrongful discharge actions premised upon contract
theories, damages are generally more limited to traditional contract remedies. See
PERRITT, supra note 3, at § 4.28. However, in some states, tort remedies are avail-
able in contract-type actions. E.g., Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693
P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984); Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 31 AM. JUR.
TRIALs 317, at § 12 (1984). See also Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Dis-
charge of At-Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 449 (1985).
82. 615 F. Supp. 1546 (D. Col. 1985).
83. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1983).
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ney's fees. In McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp.,8' a single employee
was awarded $1.3 million in actual and punitive damages. Two re-
cent California studies of wrongful discharge litigation indicated a
ninety and ninety-five percent plaintiff success rate.86 The studies
reported a $450,000.00 average and $548,000.00 median damage
award. 86
North Carolina juries are not immune to such substantial ver-
dicts. In Chaudron v. Pasquotank County Department of Social
Services,87 an eastern North Carolina jury awarded $320,000.00 in
compensatory damages and $100,000.00 in punitive damages in a
discharge case premised upon the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff
Chaudron was discharged for "conduct unbecoming a public em-
ployee" which allegedly involved "romantic overtures" toward the
public agency director.88 In Chaudron, the plaintiff established
that her substantive due process rights were abridged.,9
The trend of huge damage awards in wrongful discharge cases
is well established. The Supreme Court has often recognized "the
severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood . . . .""
When compared with the federal statutory protections, the wrong-
ful discharge theory is an economically attractive alternative for
employees.
F. Sides' North Carolina Progeny
In Walker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,9 the court of ap-
84. 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
85. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge, 40 Bus. LAW 1, 3
n.15 (1984).
86. Id. PERRITT, supra note 3, at §§ 4.28, 5.33. Cf. Brewster v. Martin Mari-
etta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378 N.W.2d 558 (1985) ($740,000
verdict); Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 25 ATLA L. Rep. 113 (April 1982) ($450,000
verdict); Smithson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 25 ATLA L. Rep. 175 (May 1982)
($125,000 verdict).
87. No. 84-CIV-2 (E.D.N.C. 1985). Among other cases, Chaudron relied upon
Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) and Barnett v. Housing Auth.,
707 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983). See also McGuinness, Pretermination Procedural
Due Process For Public Employees, Campbell Law Observer, Vol. 6, No. 8, p. 1
(Aug. 30, 1985).
88. No. 84-CIV-2 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
89. Id.
90. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985). See PER-
RT, supra note 3, at §§ 4.28, 5.33.
91. 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597,
341 S.E.2d 39 (1986).
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peals characterized Sides as "a major exception to the general rule
that an indefinite contract of employment is terminable at will"
and that an "employer's power to terminate 'at will' cannot be ab-
solute, in view of the many other societal obligations shared by em-
ployers and employees."92 In Walker, the plaintiff alleged that he
was discharged in retaliation for raising job-related safety con-
cerns." Walker noted that "workplace safety is a major public is-
sue" but nevertheless hesitated "to establish a general cause of ac-
tion for wrongful discharge for any employee discharged after
raising safety concerns." 94 In Walker, the court granted summary
judgment for the employer and reasoned that the record contained
no evidence of the time interval between when the safety concerns
were raised and the discharge. 5 The court further reasoned that
the safety concerns raised were actually unpleasant working condi-
tions and that the plaintiff presented no evidence from others who
worked in the unsafe conditions and no evidence of state or federal
safety requirements that were violated. 6
The plaintiff in Walker also proceeded under a contract the-
ory by arguing that an employee handbook became part of the em-
ployment contract. 7 The employee handbook promised to "be-
come more than a handbook. . . it will become an understanding"
and acknowledged "the responsibility of each management em-
ployee to fairly and consistently apply" the policies therein. 8 The
court recognized the "strong equitable and social policy reasons
militating against allowing employers to promulgate for their em-
ployees potentially misleading personnel manuals while reserving
their right to deviate from them at their own caprice."' 9 Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that the employment contract did not in-
clude the terms and conditions contained in the handbook. 100
The Walker court failed to follow through on its recognition of
Sides as a "major exception" to the at will rule as the most com-
pelling public policy considerations support a wrongful discharge
action for raising safety concerns. The decision in Kilpatrick v.
92. Id. at 262, 335 S.E.2d at 85 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 85.
94. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 86 (emphasis in original).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 260.
98. Id. See supra note 8.
99. Id. at 259.
100. Id.
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Delaware County Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals °l
explains why:
The United States Congress has recognized, as any rational per-
son must, that America's workplaces will not be made safe unless
workers are encouraged to take an active role in monitoring the
health and safety implications in which they are told to work.
Few employees would have the courage to report a suspected oc-
cupational hazard to an appropriate government agency if they
knew they could be fired for taking legitimate measures to protect
themselves and their co-workers. 102
In Kilpatrick, the court held that the Occupational Health and
Safety Act "announces a clear and significant public policy suffi-
cient under Pennsylvania law to give rise to a cause of action for
wrongful termination . ".. . "Numerous cases have similarly rec-
ognized the wrongful discharge doctrine under these
circumstances.1 0 4
In Walker, the reasons cited for granting summary judgment
to the employer seem quite inadequate in light of the serious na-
ture of occupational health and safety concerns. Walker presents a
classic jury question concerning the motive for the discharge. The
court's holding reveals that Sides is certainly not the "major ex-
ception" that Walker noted. Rather, Walker represents a disap-
pointing rejection of an obviously strong basis for the public policy
exception to the at will rule.
In Trought v. Richardson," the court of appeals, relying upon
Walker, held that a discharge for following state law and hospital
policy in transferring two licensed nurses was insufficient "to come
within or enlarge the exception created by Sides." 6 In Trought,
the employee alleged that it would have been a violation of the
State Nursing Practices Act to allow practical nurses to perform
101. 632 F. Supp. 542, 546 (E.D. Pa. 1986). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 660(c) (pro-
hibits discharge of employees in reprisal for exercising rights under the Act).
102. 632 F. Supp. at 546.
103. Id.
104. E.g., Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372
(1985); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
105. 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557,
344 S.E.2d 18 (1986).
106. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 619. The court in Trought also rejected claims
for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 763,
338 S.E. 2d 620.
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the duties that they were performing in the emergency room."'
The employee argued that the discharge violated the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in the employment contract.",8
Nevertheless, the court, without analysis, affirmed the dismissal of
that wrongful discharge theory.0 9
The employee in Trought also contended that an employment
manual requiring cause for dismissal was part of the employment
contract. The court denominated this theory as wrongful discharge
and reversed the dismissal of this claim."0 The employment man-
ual was signed by the employee, thus escaping the general North
Carolina rule that a unilaterally promulgated employment policy
does not become part of the contract unless expressly included.1" '
In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co.," 2 the court of appeals
noted that "[tlhough the Sides court spoke in the broad terms of
'public policy,' its holding was actually very narrow."" 3 In Hogan,
three discharged employees alleged several claims for relief includ-
ing wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and negligent hiring and retention. One plaintiff alleged that
she was sexually harassed by a co-worker and was wrongfully dis-
charged for complaining."' Another employee alleged that she was
harassed because she was required to perform tasks which she was
unable to do on account of her pregnancy and that she was dis-
charged for leaving work to receive medical treatment.'1 5 Another
employee alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for com-
plaining about verbal harassment by a co-worker."'
The Hogan court held that one employee had presented a
valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on
the allegations of sexual harassment." 7 The court reasoned that
107. Id. at 760, 338 S.E.2d at 618.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 619.
110. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 620.
111. See Walker, 77 N.C. App. at 259; Harris, 83 N.C. App. 195, 198, 349
S.E.2d 394, 396 (1986) (In Trought, "because plaintiff was required to sign the
statement, the manual became an express part of her contract of employment");
supra note 9.
112. 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346
S.E.2d 140 (1986).
113. Id. at 497-98, 340 S.E.2d at 125.
114. Id. at 485, 340 S.E.2d at 118.
115. Id. at 486, 340 S.E.2d at 118-19.
116. Id. at 485-86, 340 S.E.2d at 118.
117. Id. at 492-93, 340 S.E.2d at 122.
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"[n]o person should have to be subjected to non-consensual sexual
touchings, constant suggestive remarks and the on-going sexual
harassment . . . without being afforded remedial recourse through
our legal system." '118 The plaintiffs in Hogan argued that their dis-
charge was retaliatory and in contravention of public policy, but
the court refused to apply the public policy exception. "We inter-
pret Sides as recognizing a common law claim for relief in tort in
favor of an employee at will who is discharged from his employ-
ment in retaliation for (1) his refusal to perform an act prohibited
by law, or (2) his performance of an act required by law.""' 9
Even if Hogan was accurate in its narrow view of Sides, the
court's failure to recognize a valid public policy prohibiting sexual
harassment seems unconscionable. A plethora of federal and state
statutes and case law constitutes a compelling source of public pol-
icy forbidding sexual harassment. 20 The court recognized sexual
harassment to be so extreme and outrageous as to warrant a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, yet the court would
not even recognize a valid public policy prohibiting sexual
harassment.
The Hogan court similarly rejected the wrongful discharge
claim premised upon the employee's pregnancy and need for medi-
cal treatment. The court noted that "[allthough we sympathize
with her situation and find the manager's reason for terminating
her to be irrational, her firing was neither protected by statute nor
for an unlawful purpose." 21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,122 protects
employees from discharge on account of pregnancy. However, the
Hogan court either overlooked this or refused to consider it as a
118. 79 N.C. App. at 491, 340 S.E.2d at 121. The court in Hogan also held the
claim of negligent hiring and retention to be sufficient. See Crawford v. ITT Con-
sumer Fin. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1986); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268
Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Agis v. Howard Johnson, 371 Mass. 140, 355
N.E.2d 315 (1976); PERRITr, supra note 3, at § 5.23. But see Shreve v. Duke
Power Co., 85 N.C. App. 253, 354 S.E.2d 357 (1987) (where the court of appeals in
an employee discharge case found that the allegations were insufficient to consti-
tute such extreme and outrageous conduct).
119. 79 N.C. App. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 126.
120. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Bohen v. City of
East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
121. 79 N.C. App. at 500, 340 S.E.2d at 126.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(k) (1978). In Hogan, the court did not address the
preemption issue.
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valid public policy basis.
In Rupinsky v. Miller Brewing Co.,1 23 a federal court in Penn-
sylvania applying North Carolina law analyzed Sides and Walker.
The court noted that Walker "qualified its decision in Sides.' 24
After recognizing "the disparity of power and the potential for un-
fair results which is inherent in an employment relationship
S. . ," the court noted the North Carolina "judicial conservatism
toward allowing relief for discharged-at-will employees. 1 25
G. Implications of Sides
Sides represents a long overdue improvement in North Caro-
lina employment relations law by finally joining the growing trend
recognizing wrongful discharge. Sides advances the public interest
by condemning perjury and other conduct offensive to public pol-
icy. However, Sides' progeny has simply failed to consider and ap-
ply fairly the thrust of Sides. One case notes that Sides is a major
exception, while others insist on the most narrow interpretation of
Sides. However, given the sweeping analysis contained in Sides, it
is quite illogical to so narrowly limit the public policy exception.
Sides clearly left open the door for wrongful discharge actions
premised upon non-legislative sources of public policy where such
policy has been "otherwise established."'2 6 Nevertheless, the court
of appeals continues to brush aside this and other important as-
pects of the Sides analysis. In the Sides progeny, the court of ap-
peals seems to be preoccupied with stare decisis, but the court
must recognize its own common law analysis as explained in Sides:
[Tihe common law is not a collection of archaic, abstract legal
principles as the briefs of defendants imply - it is a living sys-
tem of law that, like the skin of a child, grows and develops as the
customs, practices and necessities of the people it was adopted for
change. The common law had its genesis in the customs and prac-
tices of the people, and its genius . . .is not only its age and
continuity, but its vitality and adaptability."2 7
123. 627 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D. Pa. 1986). Rupinsky was approvingly cited by
the court in Guy as a basis for limiting the North Carolina public policy excep-
tion. 812 F.2d at 914.
124. Id. at 1185.
125. 627 F. Supp. at 1189.
126. 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
127. Id. at 344, 328 S.E.2d at 827. Cf. Parker, supra note 3, at 195, 199, 219.
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III. ANALYSIS OF Guy
A. The Restriction of Sides in Federal Courts
The employee in Guy brought his wrongful discharge action
after he was discharged from his supervisory position at a drug
manufacturing facility. 28 Guy alleged that he was discharged for
refusing to falsify certain production and control records.'29 Guy
contended that employees were falsifying records concerning the
quality and quantity of pharmaceuticals that drug manufacturers
are required to keep under Food and Drug Administration regula-
tions.130 Falsification of these pharmaceutical records may violate
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.13 1
In Guy, Judge Wilkinson, writing for the Fourth Circuit,
briefly traced the history of the at will rule and noted "North Car-
olina's manifest commitment to the doctrine of employment at
will. 1 32 While the court summarily treated several North Carolina
cases in its brief history of the at will rule, it apparently failed to
recognize that the cases relied upon did not involve alleged viola-
tions of public policy.1 33 The court in Guy further analyzed Sides
128. 812 F.2d at 912.
129. Id.
130. Id., citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.180-198.
131. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
132. 812 F.2d at 912. The "North Carolina Supreme Court has continuously
accorded employers broad freedom in employment decisions. . .. As these cases
reveal, the at will doctrine commands long and continued support in the North
Carolina courts even in what may appear unusual and extenuating circum-
stances." Id. at 913. But see Parker, supra note 3, at 174-75. Professor Parker
states:
[T]here is no North Carolina Supreme Court precedent for including
abusive discharges within the at will rule; such a stance would amount to
the court abandoning its historically recognized role of regulating em-
ployment relations [footnotes omitted].
[T]he North Carolina Supreme court that adopted the doctrine of em-
ployment at will did not intend to insulate abusive discharges.
Id.
133. 812 F.2d at 913, citing Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611
(1979); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971); Howell v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 238 N.C. 442, 78 S.E.2d 146 (1953); Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223
N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943); Bennett v. Eastern Rebuilders, Inc., 52 N.C. App.
579, 279 S.E.2d 46 (1981). See Parker, supra note 3, at 171-73 & n.14. Professor
Parker's analysis explains:
While there are many North Carolina cases recognizing indefinite hirees
as terminable at will, the North Carolina Supreme Court has never ap-
plied the rule to a discharge which violated public policy ... The fact
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and its progeny, concluding that "Sides does not provide Guy with
a viable cause of action." Is' Guy stressed the "specific" holding in
Sides and concluded that "Sides was intended to be a limited per-
jury exception. 135
Guy noted that the employee alleged that he was discharged
for "refusal to perform a wrongful act."'' 3 6 Guy recognized that
"Hogan does offer some support for Guy's position because it char-
acterized Sides as creating a cause of action for employees who re-
fuse 'to perform an act prohibited by law.' "137 However, the court
in Guy then characterized this reasoning in Hogan as dicta and
"not sufficient to create a new cause of action for Guy."' 38 As an
additional basis for rejecting Guy's claim, the court noted that the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act establishes a complex statutory en-
forcement scheme to prohibit the sale of adulterated drugs.3 9 Fur-
ther, the court reasoned that Congress declined to include an anti-
remains that the North Carolina Supreme Court has never applied the
terminable at will rule to an indefinite term employee who is discharged
for a reason which violated public policy.
Id.
In Guy, the Fourth Circuit failed to address the good faith principle noted in
Malever. See supra note 12.
134. 812 F.2d at 914.
135. Id. at 915.
136. Id. at 913-14. Cf. Sheets, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (discharge
for complaints about substandard materials in food products); Trombetta, 81
Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (discharge for refusal to alter pollution
control reports); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (public policy exception recognized where gas station attendant dis-
charged for refusing to pump leaded gas into auto forbidden by EPA regulations
to burn leaded gasoline). See infra notes 20 and 83. The court in Sides approv-
ingly cited Sheets and Trombetta, but the Fourth Circuit in Guy addressed
neither.
137. Id. at 915, citing Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 126.
138. 812 F.2d at 915. However, Hogan expressly stated that it interpreted
Sides as recognizing a claim for refusing to perform an act prohibited by law. 79
N.C. App. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 126. Likewise, Professor Parker clarifies the ques-
tion abusive discharges pose to the courts:
Properly understood, abusive discharges which violate public policy pre-
sent a court with the same institutional issue as if an employer at-
tempted to enforce an illegal condition in a term employment contract. If
a court would not enforce an illegal condition in a contract for a term,
that court should not condone the abusive conduct by a party to an
agreement for an indefinite period. [footnote omitted]
Parker, supra note 3, at 215.
139. 812 F.2d at 915.
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retaliation provision for employees who refuse to violate the
statute. 40
B. Criticism of Guy
Guy indeed represents the most narrow view of the North
Carolina public policy exception. Guy expressly characterized
Sides as a "limited perjury exception" restricted to the egregious
facts of Sides. 4 ' The fundamental reasoning of Guy is inherently
flawed. The denial of a wrongful discharge action to Guy serves to
encourage and sanction the lawlessness that Sides so strongly con-
demned. Guy stated that "[a]ny Travenol employees who violate
the statute by falsifying required records are subject to criminal
sanctions. 1' 42 Thus, criminal implications similar to those in Sides
were present in Guy.
The court in Guy apparently failed to consider the persuasive
analysis of Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,1 4 3 in which a quality
140. Id. at 916: Cf. Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1293 (1977); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367
(1982); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851. See supra note 4.
141. 812 F.2d at 915.
142. Id. at 916.
143. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). Cf. Trombetta, 81 Mich. App. 489,
265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (discharge for refusal to alter pollution control report).
But see Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981),
where the court found that the mandate of public policy was not sufficiently clear
to support a claim where the employee was allegedly fired after reporting to com-
pany officials that his supervisors were falsifying business records and taking
bribes. After being certified to the Maryland Court of Appeals in 291 Md. 31, 432
A.2d 464 (1981), Adler survived a motion to dismiss in 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md.
1982), which was later reversed by the Fourth Circuit in 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir.
1987). In Adler, the Fourth Circuit characterized the employee's allegations as
"his intention to 'blow the whistle' on illegal activities condoned by his supervi-
sors." Id. at 1307. The Fourth Circuit found that the employee's knowledge of and
intent to report wrongdoing to higher corporate officials does not violate a clearly
mandated Maryland public policy. Id. Cf. Harless, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d
270, where the Supreme Court of West Virginia concluded that internal com-
plaints to higher officers were sufficient to contravene public policy contained in a
state consumer protection statute.
Judge Butzner dissented from the majority decision in Adler. Judge Butzner
noted that the "critical aspect of the case is the content of the disclosure Adler
intended to make." 830 F.2d at 1308. Judge Butzner highlighted the pleadings
where Adler specifically alleged that he "would not participate in, permit or con-
done continuation of the improper and illegal activities . . . ." Id. (emphasis
added). Judge Butzner then nailed down the critical flaw in the majority's reason-
ing: Adler refused to commit unlawful acts which is clearly distinguishable from
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control director was dismissed for complaining to his employer
about substandard raw materials in food products. There the em-
ployer practices caused a violation of the Connecticut labeling stat-
ute.'" In reversing the trial court, the Connecticut Supreme Court
emphasized that the employee might have been exposed to crimi-
nal liability under the state food labeling statute. "[A]n employee
should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction
or to jeopardize his continued employment."' The court in Sides
approvingly cited Sheets;"'6 nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit in
Guy either overlooked Sheets or did not consider it as persuasive.
The court's holding in Guy presents employees with quite a
dilemma: falsify records and go to jail or refuse to falsify records
and be fired. Therefore, Guy's predicament closely resembled that
of Sides. Both Guy and Sides were discharged because of their re-
fusal to participate in and condone criminal activity. It is difficult
to conceive that the Fourth Circuit did not consider the obvious,
dangerous and far-reaching implications of its decision: the con-
sumption of impure drugs by the public along with the obstruction
of justice inherent in the interference with the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act and Food and Drug Administration's regulations. To
allow employers to discharge workers for complying with such im-
portant national safety legislation represents a most blatant form
of obstruction of justice and a threat to the public health and
safety. The facts of Guy presented the most compelling scenario
for application of the public policy exception. Numerous courts
have recognized wrongful discharge theories for refusing to commit
an unlawful or wrongful act. 4"
being a mere whistle blower. Refusing to act in an unlawful manner was expressly
characterized by the Maryland Court of Appeals as being protected by the public
policy exception. Id. at 1307; 291 Md. 31, 42, 432 A.2d 464, 470 (1981). Judge
Butzner's reasoning is most compelling. The implications of the majority decision
are dangerous in that illegality is condoned. Cf. supra text accompanying note 101
and infra text accompanying notes 103-09. See PERRITT, supra note 3, at §§ 5.16,
5.17.
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-222, superseded by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-
102 (West 1983).
145. 179 Conn. at 480, 427 A.2d at 389. See Winther v. DEC Int'l, 625 F.
Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985) (refusal to violate antitrust laws); Beasley v. Affiliated
Hosp. Prods., 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (refusal to fix results of raffle).
146. 74 N.C. App. at 341, 328 S.E.2d at 825.
147. See, e.g., supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; Tamney v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (discharge for refusal to par-
ticipate in an illegal price fixing scheme); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home,
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In Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc.,14 8 the South Car-
olina Supreme Court recently recognized a public policy exception.
In Ludwick, the court held that:
[t]he public policy exception is invoked when an employer re-
quires an at-will employee, as a condition of retaining employ-
ment, to violate the law. To hold otherwise would sanction defi-
ance of the legal process legislated by the General Assembly.
In a nation of laws the mere encouragement that one violate
the law is unsavory; the threat of retaliation for refusing to do so
is intolerable and impermissible. 4
Hogan's observation that Sides created a cause of action for
employees discharged for refusing to perform an act prohibited by
law is most compelling and is strongly supported by the South
Carolina decision in Ludwick. This, along with the sweeping analy-
sis in Sides, provides sufficient guidance for the federal courts to
realistically employ the public policy exception in North Carolina.
However, the court in Guy noted that "[iun applying state law, fed-
eral courts have always found the road straighter and the going
smoother when, instead of blazing new paths, they restrict their
travels to the pavement."' 150 The facts of Guy did not necessitate
blazing a new path but simply required an application of the fun-
damental framework of Sides and Hogan. While the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals in its three post-Sides decisions 511 did not
apply the Sides doctrine to recognize new public policy theories,
the facts of Guy were substantially closer to the facts of Sides than
Inc., 69 Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984) (discharge for threatening to report pa-
tient abuse to state enforcement agency); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 297 Or.
10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (discharge for refusing to sign a false statement); Bowman
v. State Bank, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985) (discharge for claiming proxy
statements violated securities laws); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (discharge for instituting an accounting system in
compliance with the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1977); Harless, 162 W. Va.
116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (discharge for protesting employer's practice of making
illegal loans); PERRIrr, supra note 3, at §§ 5.16-5.18; See Hauck v. Sabine Pilots,
Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (em-
ployee discharged for refusing to pump boat bilges in illegal manner); Cf. supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
148. 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
149. Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
150. 812 F.2d at 917. Cf. Adler, 830 F.2d 1303, 1306 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Courts
must use care in creating new public policy.")
151. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. 483; 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986); Trought, 78 N.C. App.
758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986); Walker, 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985).
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those cases. Consequently, the concerns identified in the post-
Sides North Carolina cases were not present in Guy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sides doctrine presents a fair and workable framework for
addressing discharge disputes. It strikes a balance between genuine
public policy interests on a case-by-case basis and the employer's
right to terminate where the termination does not contravene es-
tablished public policy. However, given the extremely narrow in-
terpretation by the post-Sides cases, the impact of Sides has been
only minimal.
While Sides opened the door to wrongful discharge in North
Carolina, the subsequent cases have sorely missed the mark. Re-
cent cases have ignored controlling precedent in Haskins and
Malever. The decision in Guy is palpably flawed and its dangerous
implications should help convince the North Carolina courts to ful-
fill the true meaning of Sides. The issues are ripe for clarification
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The supreme court should
reaffirm the fundamental reasoning of Sides but clarify and ex-
pand its potential application to the more typical discharge dis-
pute. Moreover, the good faith principle adopted in Haskins and
reaffirmed in Malever must be given new life. The North Carolina
General Assembly should enact wrongful discharge legislation to
clarify and reform the law in this confusing area.1 5s "The courts
152. See Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div., 638 F. Supp. 726 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(Ultimate solution for flood of wrongful discharge cases is for legislatures to artic-
ulate standards.).
Montana enacted the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act. The legis-
lation provides that:
A discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy
or for reporting a violation of public policy; or
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had com-
pleted the employer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written per-
sonnel policy.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1987).
Public policy is defined as "a policy in effect at the time of the discharge
concerning the public health, safety or welfare established by constitutional provi-
sion, statute, or administrative rule." Id. at § 39-2-903(7).
This legislation has broad implications substantively. Further, it provides for
up to four years of back pay with interest along with punitive damages under
some circumstances but generally excludes compensatory damages, pain and suf-
[Vol. 10:217
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will be very derelict in their duty if they do not force justice in
favor of employees as well as the public."' 53 Employment at will
and abusive discharges simply have no place in modern North Car-
olina law.
fering, and emotional distress. Id. at § 39-2-905. See Summers, Individual Protec-
tion Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
Several states have enacted "whistleblower" acts which usually protect spe-
cific employee conduct. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31.51 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, §
813 (1974 & Supp. 1985); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15.361 (West 1981 & Supp.
1985); LARSON, supra note 3, at § 5.03; PERRITT, supra note 3, at § 9.7; supra note
65.
153. Greenlee v. Southern Ry., 122 N.C. 977, 981, 30 S.E. 115, 116 (1898).
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